Having the Department of Revenue manage child support enforcement is a great benefit available under the law. That is, until a party overpays—and no child support flows in either direction between the parents, as here. In a May 2025 decision with broad implications for child support enforcement in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court held in Jeevanandam v. Bharathan, SJC-13687, that the Department of Revenue (DOR) lacks the statutory authority to enforce reimbursement of child support overpayments through wage assignment when those repayments are not themselves for the “support and maintenance of a child.”
The court’s decision clearly limits what the DOR’s Child Support Enforcement Division can enforce. It also explains how to seek repayment when support orders change retroactively.
Special Needs Child, Divorce, and 9 Years of Child Support
The case arises from a post-divorce modification involving a child with special needs. The parents divorced in 2012. After the divorce, the court ordered the father to pay weekly child support to the mother, who held primary custody. For years, the DOR enforced those payments.
In 2021, the father filed a complaint for modification. Their child, placed in a fully state-funded residential program, no longer lived with either parent. Judge Bisenius of Probate and Family Court retroactively terminated the father’s support obligation to January 1, 2022. However, payments continued through that period.
The father sought reimbursement from the mother for the child support he had paid after the retroactive date and requested that the DOR collect those overpayments via wage assignment. The judge granted that relief, ordering the mother to repay the overpayment to the father and requiring the DOR to collect it through its usual wage garnishment mechanisms.
The DOR objected, arguing it lacked statutory authority to enforce such an order. After the judge denied the DOR’s motion for reconsideration, the agency appealed. The SJC transferred the case on its own motion and reversed the lower court’s order.
What Counts as a “Support Order”?
At the heart of the case was the statutory definition of “support order” under G.L. c. 119A, § 1A. The statute authorizes the DOR to enforce judgments “for the support and maintenance of a child,” and defines “support order” as including “monetary support, health care coverage, arrearages, or reimbursement…for the support and maintenance of a child.”
The father focused on the word “reimbursement,” arguing that since the repayment order arose from an overpayment of support, it qualified as a support order.
The SJC disagreed. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Wolohojian held that the term “reimbursement” in the statute must be read in context. The statute authorizes the DOR to enforce only those orders where the reimbursement itself is “for the support and maintenance of a child.” In this case, the court emphasized that the state—not either parent—was fully meeting the child’s needs, and that the child support obligation had already ended. As such, the repayment obligation was simply a personal debt from the mother to the father—not child support.
The Overpayment was not DOR’s Mistake
The Court rejected the father’s alternative argument that G.L. c. 119A, § 10A(b), which requires the DOR to make “diligent efforts to recover” certain erroneous payments, provided an enforcement pathway. That provision, the Court noted, applies only when the Commissioner of Revenue independently determines that the payment was improperly distributed. No such finding had been made in this case.
In fact, the DOR had merely followed court orders and made distributions consistent with an enforceable support judgment. The SJC noted that this case involved no administrative error or unauthorized payment by the DOR, so § 10A(b) didn’t apply.
What to Remember about this Case:
1. DOR Enforcement Is Limited to Actual Support
The DOR cannot be compelled to collect reimbursements unless those payments are themselves for the “support and maintenance of a child.” If a support obligation is terminated retroactively and overpayments are ordered returned, the repaying parent must use traditional debt enforcement mechanisms, not DOR services.
2. Probate & Family Court Judges Cannot Expand DOR’s Authority
The Court reiterated a core administrative law principle: judges may not order an agency to act beyond its statutory mandate. This is a critical reminder for family court judges navigating the intersection of court orders and administrative enforcement.
3. Know the Limits When Modifying Retroactively
Attorneys or parties seeking retroactive modifications of support should not expect DOR to assist with a retroactive rebalancing unless crafted in compliance with the statute, which could be possible if there’s an ongoing basis for child support. Even if a judge orders reimbursement, clients should be prepared to pursue repayment directly from the recipient through a contempt action if the reimbursement can’t be worked out cooperatively.
4. Clarity for Parents of Children in State Programs
This decision offers guidance for parents whose children reside in government-funded residential placements. The presence of a public care program may eliminate the need and legal basis for direct support between parents, so parents would be wise to address any existing child support orders when such placements are being made.
Conclusion
Jeevanandam v. Bharathan is a reminder that not all financial obligations arising in family court are enforceable through DOR channels. The SJC’s decision draws a firm line between support obligations designed to maintain a child and debt obligations between former spouses, even when those obligations arose out of child support orders.