Is “Lifetime Alimony” truly dead in Massachusetts?
The Alimony Reform Act became effective on March 1, 2012. It allows modifying alimony based on material changes in circumstances. The Act set presumptive termination dates for marriages under 20 years. For example, alimony lasts half the marriage duration for five-year marriages, or 60% for marriages lasting five to ten years.
The Alimony Reform Act allows judges to deviate from termination dates if it’s in the “interests of justice.” The recent case of George v. George clarified when such a deviation is appropriate. [1] The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the dismissal of a modification claim by the Probate and Family Court judge.
The judge denied the modification claims for two reasons. First, It filed prematurely, before the permissible date. Second, deviation from the Alimony Reform Act’s durational time limits was not justified. The judge noted the wife “bargained for” a specific alimony termination date in exchange for a certain division of property. Had she known of an earlier termination, she likely would have sought different property terms. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the claimant filed the modification claim prematurely.
However, the court disagreed with the Probate and Family Court judge’s decision to allow deviation from the alimony end dates. It emphasized that a judge must evaluate the circumstances for alimony modification “in the here and now,” based on the present situation, not the time of the divorce. (The Court noted that if there are continuing circumstances which existed at the time of divorce and continue to exist at the time modification is sought—such as the disability of one of the spouses—then those circumstances may be considered in determining whether to deviate from the alimony end dates.)
But here, the trial court’s analysis was flawed, the Supreme Judicial Court noted, in theorizing that the payee spouse would have bargained for a different property division award if she knew that alimony payments would cease due to the deviation in alimony end dates. “[T]his logic might prevent nearly all payor spouses with alimony obligations predating the act from ever gaining the benefit of the act’s durational limits, because recipient spouses could argue that, had they known that their alimony payments would be affected by the act, they would have negotiated their separation agreement differently,” the Court stated. “This is in direct contravention of the Legislature’s intent that the durational limits apply to preexisting alimony awards.”[2]
Should you have any questions about alimony or other domestic relations or family law issues, give our office a call. You may schedule a free consultation with us, and one of our experienced family law attorneys will get back to you. [1] George v. George, SJC-12059 (September 6, 2016-November 23, 2016). [2] Id., at 11.