When lawmakers reform a section of law, they generally rewrite a large body of its provisions. When that happens, accounting for every possible application of the law becomes impossible. As a result, the law evolves through judicial interpretation. The most recent major revision of our divorce and family law in Massachusetts was the Alimony Reform Act of 2011. Among other major changes, discussed elsewhere on our site, was the addition of circumstances which would justify terminating alimony.
The first major development was when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided the case of Chin v. Merriot, which addresses the conditions of reaching full retirement age and cohabitation after divorce.
Before the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, the primary way to terminate alimony was by proving a material change in circumstances. This was essentially the only method, aside from death or remarriage. Without a material change, the court could require the paying party to pay alimony for life unless they returned to justify its termination. You might be wondering: what would qualify as a material change in circumstances? Well, that is precisely the issue. In Massachusetts, probate and family judges have broad discretion in divorce and family law cases. This makes it difficult to predict a judge’s determination of a material change.
Before the Alimony Reform Act, case law defined material changes in circumstances on a case-by-case basis. In 1986, a case rules against the argument that alimony should be modified or terminated solely because the recipient spouse cohabits with another individual. Similarly, a 2009 case rejected the argument that retirement was a justification for terminating alimony. Both courts stated that these facts alone were not enough to terminate or modify alimony. Rather, they would have needed to prove a material change in circumstances. This change must justify modifying or terminating alimony. The Chin case notably cited both cases. The person seeking alimony payments must convince the judge that a significant event occurred. Additionally, they must show that alimony is no longer appropriate.
The 2011 Alimony Reform Act limited judicial discretion in alimony modification cases. It established circumstances where alimony would terminate without proving a material change in circumstances.
Chin dealt with a predictable issue following a major reform act. Chin and Merriot married in 1998 and divorced in August 2011. The parties settled their divorce through a separation agreement. Chin (husband) agreed to pay Merriot (wife) $650 monthly. Payments would continue until either party’s death or wife’s remarriage. The separation agreement provision merged into the final judgment. This made the provision modifiable in the future.
At the time the parties entered into the agreement, Chin was already 67 years old and his wife was 69. The government enacted the Alimony Reform Act, allowing alimony to terminate when the payer reaches full retirement age. Chin filed a complaint for modification in the Probate and Family Court to end his alimony obligation under the new law. He amended the complaint, citing another basis for termination under the Alimony Reform Act: his ex-wife’s cohabitation with a new partner.
The modification went to trial and the judge dismissed the complaint. The judge determined that the termination conditions in the Act apply only to cases established after March 1, 2012. This is the Act’s effective date. The case was appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court eventually took up review.
The SJC ultimately held that alimony awards which were merged into a final judgment prior to March 1, 2012 may only be modified or terminated based upon the law which then existed. Petitioners must prove a material change in circumstances to modify or terminate. The law can be complex at times. In this case, the Court determined that the outcome was consistent with the original legislative intent when the law was first drafted. To determine the legislative intent, the court examined the uncodified provisions of the Act. These provisions were part of the original Act but not codified.
I should note, as the Court did, that there is a basis specifically enumerated in the statute which provides for the modification of the duration of general term alimony awards entered before March 1, 2012 consistent with the new law, but otherwise you must prove a material change in circumstances.
The case law has continued to evolve, of course, since the issuance of the Chin opinion and the analysis set forth here is based on the law up to that point in time. To learn more about how alimony reform has evolved since, continue to read our blog or call our office at 978-225-9030 and schedule a consultation. The Chin case is really a very good illustration of why you should have an experienced divorce and family law lawyer as an advocate. Most lawyers would not think to look research the issues to such depth as was done by the court in this case and, while it is important to educate yourself on the basics of the law, there is no substitute for meeting with an experienced divorce lawyer and understanding how the law applies to the specific facts of your case.